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Here are two widely accepted claims about (moral) desert. First, people 
differ from one another in terms of how deserving they are, and because 
of this, some deserve more than others. Second, other things being equal, 
it is an intrinsically good thing for people to get what they deserve. 
These two claims-which I will pretty much take as given in this 
paper-seem simple and straightforward enough. Of course, they imme-
diately bring us face to face with some familiar (and perennially contro-
versial) questions. For example, what exactly is the relevant desert basis? 
That is, by virtue of what is it that one person is more deserving than 
another? And what, exactly, is the relevant deserved magnitude? That is, 
what is it that the more deserving deserve more ofl 
In this paper, I will have nothing much to say about these more 
familiar questions. For concreteness, to be sure, I am going to assume 
that the more deserving are more deserving because they are more virtu-
ow (and the less deserving are less deserving because they are more 
vicious). This strikes me as a plausible enough suggestion, as far as it 
goes, but for present purposes we can take such talk of virtue and vice as 
something of a placeholder for a more complete specification of the desert 
basis, whatever it is. Similarly, I am going to assume that what the more 
deserving deserve more of is well-being. That is, in certain situations, at 
least, the more virtuous deserve to be better off. This too strikes me as a 
plausible enough suggestion, but I believe that little of what I say below 
turns on it being correct; those who accept a different account of the 
deserved magnitude should be able to readily translate my discussion 
into their own, more favored, idiom. 
Another familiar question is whether or not it is truly the case that 
desert has intrinsic moral significance. After all, if we reward moral be-
havior (and punish immoral behavior) this will lead to better results over-
all. Perhaps, then, considerations of desert have only instrumental sig-
nificance: it may be instrumentally valuable for people to get what they 
deserve, but not good in and of itself. However, my concern in this paper 
is not to defend the second claim-the claim that desert is not only 
instrumentally but also intrinsically significant-but rather to explore it. 
Accordingly, I am simply going to assume that it is indeed an intrinsically 
good state of affairs for someone to be getting what they deserve. (Of 
course, to claim that desert has intrinsic value in this way is not at all to 
claim that it is the only thing with intrinsic value; in any given case the 
intrinsic value of someone's getting what they deserve might well be 
outweighed by other, intrinsically bad, features of the situation.) 
But once these various familiar questions are put aside, it may seem 
as though there is little left to discuss. What remains, as I say, seems 
straightforward enough: people differ in terms of how deserving they are, 
and it is intrinsically good for people to get what they deserve. 
In fact, however, I think that there is a great deal left to discuss. The 
topic of desert is a surprisingly complicated one-<:omplicated in ways 
that have been largely overlooked. Or so I shall argue.• 
To fix intuitions, consider the following case. Imagine that there has 
been an explosion in the factory, and two workers-Amos and Boris-
have been injured. Paramedics are on their way, but both Amos and Boris 
are in considerable pain. Unfortunately, we have only one dose of pain-
killer-so we can help either Amos or Boris, but not both. If we imagine as 
well that other things are equal (the two are in equal pain, the painkiller 
will help both equally, neither owns the painkiller, and so forth), then it 
seems as though we should flip a coin in choosing between them. 
But let us now change one important detail. Suppose that it is Boris's 
fault that the explosion took place (perhaps he negligently forgot to tum 
off the sparking mechanism), while Amos is completely blameless (he is 
not at all at fault for the explosion). Intuitively, this changes things. It 
breaks the tie. Most of us believe that it is now preferable to give the 
painkiller to innocent Amos, rather than to somewhat culpable Boris. 
Because Boris is at fault, while Amos is not, it is better to help Amos 
rather than Boris, given that we cannot help both. Boris deserves a lower 
level of priority, at least when compared to Amos. 
We can call the view at work herefaultforfeitsfirst.2 According to 
this view, those who are at fault deserve to go .. to the back of the line .. 
behind those who are not culpable. Accordingly, since we cannot aid 
both Amos and Boris, it is better (in terms of desert) to aid innocent 
Amos, rather than culpable Boris. 
Note that accepting this view is compatible with insisting that if 
there were enough painkiller to treat both Amos and Boris, then it would 
be better still to do this. The claim being put forward now is only the 
modest claim that if we cannot help both, it is better to help the innocent. 
There is no suggestion (yet) that it would be better to leave Boris in his 
pain, even ifthere were enough painkiller to go around. 
Consider, now, a further modification to the case. Imagine, as before, 
that Boris caused the explosion, but assume now that he did this inten-
tionally. Perhaps he was delibel"!ltely trying to injure Amos (without justi-
fication), but incompetently got caught in the explosion as well. 
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Some people-call them retributivist.s-think that in this revised 
case it might well be true that even if we could aid both Amos and Boris 
it would be better to leave Boris unaided. Of course, any given retributivist 
might not think this about the particular case as we have just described it, 
but in principle, at least, retributivists believe that if Boris is sufficiently 
vicious then it would be better not to aid him, better to leave him suffer-
ing. That is, if someone is sufficiently vicious, they can deserve to suffer. 
In contrast, moderates about desert believe that no one deserves to 
suffer, no matter how vicious they are. Thus, provided that there is enough 
painkiller to go around, it cannot possibly be better to leave Boris un-
aided. 
Note, however, that although the moderate rejects retributivism, she 
still accepts the view that fault forfeits first: while it is better to aid both 
Amos and Boris if one can, forced to choose between the two it is better 
to aid Amos; Boris still goes to the back of the line behind Amos. (The 
retributivist, in contrast, accepts a version of fault forfeits first according 
to which if Boris is sufficiently vicious he may in fact get kicked out ofthe 
line for aid altogether!) 
Regardless of whether you are a moderate or a retributivist, you are 
going to want an expansive understanding of fault forfeits first, to take 
into account the fact that culpability and fault come in various degrees. 
This may already be apparent with regard to the retributivist, since the 
retributivist thinks that only those who are sufficiently vicious deserve 
to suffer; but it is true, as well, for the moderate. 
Suppose, for example, that there are three people who have been 
injured in the explosion: Amos is completely blameless, and Boris is some-
what culpable (having negligently failed to check the sparking mecha-
nism), while this time it is Catherine who is quite vicious (deliberately 
leaving the sparking mechanism turned on so as to injure Amos). Clearly, 
Amos is the person who most deserves our aid. But if we can aid a 
second person as well, who should it be? If all we are told is that the 
culpable go to the back ofthe line behind the blameless, this doesn't yet 
tell us whether (after having aided Amos) we should help Boris or help 
Catherine. 
Presumably, however, even the moderate will agree that it is better to 
help Boris than Catherine in this case, given Catherine's considerably 
greater level of vice. (Of course, the moderate also insists that it would be 
best to help all three, if only we could.) Thus even the moderate will want 
to accept a version of fault forfeits first according to which different 
degrees of fault are to be distinguished. We should assume, therefore, 
that according to fault forfeits first the more culpable and vicious deserve 
to go "behind" those who are less culpable or vicious. 
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We will probably want to expand our understanding of fault forfeits 
first in a second way as well. Suppose that Frank is only slightly more 
culpable than Frances. If so, it seems implausible to claim that it is better 
to help Frances rather than Frank {if we can only help one of the two) 
regardless of how much we can do for each of them. It might be, for 
example, that we can help Frank a great deal, while we can only help 
Frances a small amount. In such a case, presumably, despite the fact that 
Frank's needs having a lower priority (unit for unit), this is outweighed 
by the fact that we can do so much more good for him. Thus, a plausible 
version of fault forfeits first will take into account not only how culpable 
someone is, but also how much good we can do for that person. 
Now one way to capture this {doubly) enriched conception of fault 
forfeits first would be through the idea of a culpability discount rate. For 
those who are blameless we can let potential increases in well-being carry 
their full weight {zero discount). But for those who are culpable we can 
partially discount well-being, so that it counts for less, unit for unit The 
more vicious the individual, the greater the discount For example, ifBoris 
is only slightly culpable, potential increases in his well-being might be 
discounted by 20%, while if Boris is highly vicious the discount rate 
might be 70% (or even higher). 
A view like this readily incorporates the two desirable features that 
we have just identified. On the one hand, we can make fine-grained dis-
tinctions between varying levels of fault, assigning steeper discounts for 
the more vicious. And at the same time, using a discount rate also allows 
us to capture the plausible idea that even if someone is more vicious it 
might still be better to aid them, if they have enough more at stake. For 
example, even ifTom has a discount rate of40%, while Larry has a dis-
count rate of only 20%, if I have to choose between aiding Larry by I 0 
units of well-being and aiding Tom by IS units, it will do more good to aid 
Tom. {Admittedly, gains to Tom are discounted by 40%, which means that 
they get only 60% of their "normal" or full weight, while gains to Larry are 
discounted only 20%, so they get80% of their full weight But60% of 15 
is 9, while 800/o of 10 is only 8.) 
So long as the discount rate never reaches 1 OOo/o-no matter how 
vicious the individual in question may be-a view like this will be accept-
able to moderates. For no matter how steep the discount is, so long as it 
is less than 100% it will always do at least some good (from the stand-
point of desert) to aid the needy. Thus, given sufficient resources, it will 
always be best to help everyone, just as the moderate insists. 
As a limit case, some moderates may in fact be willing to allow the 
discount rate to reach I 00% for extraordinarily vicious individuals. A 
person this vicious would have no claim to being helped at all; from the 
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standpoint of desert their well-being would be completely discounted. Of 
course, allowing for this possibility distinguishes this position from that 
of a typical moderate. For if 1 00% discounts are possible, then even when 
we do have enough resources to help everyone, it won't necessarily 
make things better to do this. 
Note, however, that even if we do go this far, we have not yet em-
braced the retributivist claim that for those who are sufficiently vicious, it 
is better if they suffer. For even if well-being is completely discounted, 
that doesn't yet "reverse" the normal order of things, making suffering 
into something intrinsically good (from the point of view of desert). To do 
that, we need to allow for discounts even steeper than 1.00%. 
Of course, to talk this way runs the risk of seeming paradoxical. How 
can there be a discount greater than a "complete" discount? Accord-
ingly, it may be preferable to talk, instead, of a culpability multiplier. 
Instead of saying, for example, that a mildly culpable individual has a 
discount rate of20%, we can say that she has a culpability multiplier of .8. 
(Potential increases in well-being must then be multiplied by .8 to deter-
mine their weight from the standpoint of desert.) Similarly, a significantly 
vicious individual may have a multiplier of.3 (corresponding, of course, 
to a discount rate of70%), while a completely blameless individual will 
have a multiplier of 1 (corresponding to a discount rate ofO). 
We might then state the distinction between moderates and 
retributivists in this way. Moderates believe that culpability multipliers 
must be positive, or at worst zero. Retributivists, in contrast, believe that 
multipliers can be negative. For it is, of course, precisely a negative 
multiplier that is required to reverse the normal value of well-being. With 
a negative multiplier, increases in well-being will actually make things 
worse, rather than better; improving the situation (from the standpoint of 
desert) will instead require a reduction in well-being. Thus, by allowing 
negative multipliers in sufficiently extreme cases, we can capture the 
retributivist idea that sufficiently vicious individuals deserve to suffer. 
Thinking of desert in terms of a culpability multiplier still leaves us 
with a fairly simple picture, all told. In various ways I believe it remains 
inadequate. But we will be in a better position to discover a superior 
account if we first try our hand at visually displaying the sort of view we 
have been developing. For we can, I believe, better appreciate the com-
plex nature of desert if we approach it graphically. 
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Well-being 
Figure l. Desert Graph axes with a sample poinl 
In Figure 1, the X axis represents possible levels of well-being. Points 
to the right of the origin represent lives worth living overall, and the 
further to the right, the greater the level of well-being. Points to the left of 
the origin represent lives not worth living overall (lives worse than noth-
ing), and the further to the left, the worse the level of well-being. 
(On an alternative approach, which some may prefer, the X axis would 
represent not the overall level of well-being, but rather the magnitude of 
the reward or punishment that someone receives. For simplicity of expo-
sition, however, I will assume that it is indeed overall well-being that is 
being represented here.) 
The y axis represents the goodness of a given state of affairs from 
the point of view of desert. (Actually, it only represents goodness from 
the point of view of noncomparative desert; but the meaning of this 
qualification-and the need for it-won't become clear until later.) More 
precisely, the Y axis represents the contribution made to the intrinsic 
value of a given state of affairs by someone's having, or failing to have, 
what they deserve. Points above the origin represent states of affairs that 
are good from the standpoint of desert; those below the origin, states of 
affairs that are bad from the standpoint of desert. 
Note that theY axis does not represent the overall intrinsic value of 
a given state of affairs, but only the particular contribution made to this 
arising from desert. If someone has what they deserve, this is an intrinsi-
cally good state of affairs (regardless of whether this is in tum outweighed 
by still other considerations), and theY axis tells us how good a state of 
affairs it is. But it focuses solely upon the intrinsic goodness ofthat fact 
from the point of view of desert; other intrinsic values simply do not 
register here. 
Thus, to place a point-such as A-within this coordinate space is 
to say how good (or bad) it is, from the standpoint of desert, for the 
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relevant individual to be at the specified level ofwell-being. The X coor-
dinate of the given point will of course correspond to some particular 
level of well-being, and theY coordinate of the point will indicate how 
good (or bad) it would be for the individual in question to be at that 
particular level. By marking out similar points, for still other levels of well-
being, we would eventually generate the individual desert line for the 
given individual. Such a line would tell us just how good (or bad) it would 
be-from the point of view of desert-for the individual to be at the 
various possible levels of well-being. 
Now if the individual in question is blameless-Amos, for example-
then the culpability multiplier will be I. Each unit of well-being will have 
its full, normal weight; and a one unit increase in well-being will make 
things one unit better from the standpoint of desert. Thus we have an 
individual desert line like that shown in Figure 2A: a straight line with a 
positive slope of I. Increases in well-being make things better from the 
standpoint of desert, and increases in suffering make things worse. 
A B c 
Figure 2. Individual desert lines. 
Suppose, however, that we want to draw the individual desert line for 
someone who is slightly culpable. Imagine that Boris has a multiplier of 
.8. This means, of course, that each potential unit of well-being for Boris 
will generate only .8 units of good from the standpoint of desert. (In 
contrast, of course, for Amos each unit of well-being generates I unit of 
good.) Here, too, the result will be a straight line with positive slope, but 
this time the slope will be .8. 
Figure 2B displays the individual desert Jines for both Amos and 
Boris. This desert graph makes it plain that, unit for unit, more good is 
done by aiding Amos rather than Boris. Boris's line has a gentler slope 
than Amos's line, and so potential increases in well-being do less good 
than comparable increases for Amos. But the graph also makes it easy to 
see that, despite this, in certain cases it will do more good to aid Boris 
rather Amos. (For example, if we must choose between having Amos at 
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the origin, and Boris at B, or Boris at the origin and Amos at A, it will do 
more total good, from the standpoint of desert, to aid Boris.) 
If Catherine is still more culpable or vicious than Boris her multiplier 
will be even smaller, and this will result in an individual desert line with an 
even gentler slope. The result is shown in Figure 2C. We could easily add 
still other lines, but these three should suffice to illustrate the geneml 
point: increases in vice rotate individual desert lines clockwise (around 
the origin); increased virtue rotates desert lines counterclockwise. 
(In Figure 2C, of course, none of the desert lines have a slope greater 
than L This corresponds to the assumption that culpability multipliers 
have an upper bound at 1. But this assumption could be questioned. 
Perhaps particularly virtuous individuals will have desert lines with slopes 
that are even greater than 1.) 
Provided that we are modemtes, of course, there is a clear limit to the 
amount of clockwise rotation that is possible. If multipliers must remain 
positive, then no matter how vicious the individual in question may be, 
the slope of the individual desert line will always remain positive as well. 
(And even if multipliers are allowed to reach zero, so long as they cannot 
go past this, slopes cannot become negative.) 
If one is a retributivist, however, then the possibility of individual 
desert lines with negative slopes opens up. Figure 3 displays one such 
line. (Other lines, with even steeper negative slopes, are possible as well.) 
This is the desert line of a person-call him Dorian-who is sufficiently 
vicious that he deserves to sutTer. Even if one could aid him, from the 
perspective of desert it is better not to. Suppose, for example, that Dorian 
is actually at the level of well-being corresponding to (the X coordinate 
of) point A. Even if we could increase this, moving him instead to (the 
level of well-being corresponding to the X coordinate of) point B, this 
would actually make things worse from the standpoint of desert, as we 
immediately see by noting that B has a lower location along the Y axis 
than A. In terms of what Dorian deserves, then, it is better to leave him at 
A. Indeed, since Dorian deserves to sutTer, it would be better still if he 
were at C mther than A. 
B Dorian 
Figure 3. A desert line with negative slope. 
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Although Dorian's desert line has a negative slope, it is fairly gentle. 
It corresponds to a culpability multiplier of("only") -.3. The retributivist, 
however, can certainly allow for the possibility of individuals who are 
even more vicious than this. An extraordinarily vicious individual, for 
example, might have a desert line with a slope of -.8, or even -1 (or perhaps 
even steeper). All of these people will of course deserve to suffer, but in 
keeping with our enriched conception of fault forfeits first, there will be 
relevant distinctions to be drawn between them. For example, if Eleanor 
has a desert line with a slope of -.8, then other things being equal it is 
more important that Eleanor suffer than Dorian. Unit for unit, it does more 
good (from the standpoint of desert) for Eleanor to have the unhappiness 
she deserves than for Dorian to have the unhappiness he deserves. Other 
things being equal, it is more important (from the standpoint of desert) for 
Eleanor to be punished. (Of course the greater priority to be given to 
punishing Eleanor can be outweighed, if one can give Dorian sufficiently 
more of what he deserves.) 
All of this seems fairly straightforward, at least from the perspective 
of the retributivist (moderates, of course, are unwilling to countenance 
negative slopes). Nonetheless, there is a problem. Consider once again 
the desert line in Figure 3. Since Dorian deserves to suffer, his desert line 
continues down and to the right: if, contrary to what he deserves, Dorian 
is well-ofT, this is a bad state of affairs; and the better ofT Dorian is, the 
worse it is. Putting the same thought the other way around, the desert 
line moves up and to the lefi, thereby representing the claim that Dorian 
deserves to suffer-so that if he does suffer, this is actually a good thing. 
(It may not be better overall, of course, but the Y axis only represents 
goodness from the standpoint of desert.) 
But the desert line shown in Figure 3 moves up and to the left forever. 
This entails more than the basic retributivist claim that Dorian deserves 
to suffer. Indeed, it entails a far stronger claim, that the greater the level of 
Dorian's suffering, the better the state of affairs. As Dorian's suffering 
grows greater and greater, the resulting state of affairs is, from the point 
of view of desert, better and better. 
This is clearly an unacceptable position, and even retributivists will 
want to reject it. It is, after all, one thing to say that Dorian deserves to 
suffer. It is quite another thing to say that he deserves unlimited suffer-
ing, so that the worse ofT he is, the better. On the contrary, it seems 
intuitively clear that even if Dorian deserves to suffer, at a certain point 
he will be suffering enough. If his level of suffering is greater than this, 
then this is more suffering than he deserves: he is suffering too much. 
Accordingly, if Dorian's suffering is increased beyond this point, this 
does not make things better from the standpoint of desert; rather, it makes 
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things worse. Indeed, the more and more he suffers beyond this point. 
the worse and worse things get. 
Presumably, then, retributivists don't actually accept the sort of desert 
line shown in Figure 3. Rather they will want to claim that Dorian's desert 
line looks more like the mountain shaped line shown in Figure 4. Here it 
remains true that Dorian deserves to suffer. But there is a limit to how 
much he deserves to suffer. This point is marked by the (X coordinate of 
the) peak ofthe mountain. 
The peak 
Figure 4. A mountain shaped desert line. 
We can say that the peak marks the particular level of suffering that 
Dorian absolutely deserves. If Dorian's actual level of well-being is pre-
cisely at this level, then this situation is optimal from the standpoint of 
desert. But if Dorian is worse off than this, or for that matter better otT 
than this, then the situation is less than optimal. The goodness of the 
situation drops off. That's why the desert line slopes down and away 
from the peak on both sides. Not only is it a bad thing (or, more precisely, 
a less than optimal thing) if Dorian has more than he deserves, it is also a 
bad thing if he has less than he deserves. Dorian deserves to suffer, but 
only so much. 
Let us suppose, then, that the retributivist believes that even if some-
one deserves to suffer, there is a limit to how much they deserve to 
suffer-there is a particular level of suffering that they absolutely de-
serve, and to suffer more than this is a bad (or less than optimal) state of 
affairs. Even so, there is no reason to suppose that the precise level of 
suffering that is absolutely deserved is always the same, regardless of 
how vicious the given individual may be. On the contrary, it seems more 
plausible to suppose that the more vicious someone is, the greater the 
amount of suffering they absolutely deserve. Thus, all vicious individu-
als will have individual desert lines that are shaped like mountains, but 
the peaks will be located at different points along the X axis. The more 
vicious the individual in question, the further to the west will be the 
peak-thus marking the fact that the person absolutely deserves a lower 
level of well-being. 
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One possible way of capturing a view like this is shown in Figure 5. 
Figure 5. Some desert lines with negative peaks. 
Now Figure 5 only displays desert lines for people who deserve to 
suffer. For each such person there is a particular level of well-being that is 
absolutely deserved. But I am inclined to believe (perhaps somewhat 
cynically) that the very same thing is true for everyone, including those 
who deserve to be happy. That is to say, even for those who do deserve 
to be happy there is some particular level of well-being that is absolutely 
deserved. And while it is less than optimal, from the standpoint of desert, 
for the person to have less than he deserves, it is also less than optimal, 
I believe, for him to have more than he deserves. Thus mountain shaped 
desert lines are appropriate even for those who deserve to be happy. 
Of course, even if we accept this, it isn't plausible to think that all 
those who deserve to be happy deserve the very same level of well-
being. On the contrary, here too we should expect that differences in 
virtue will be reflected in differences in the level of well-being that is 
absolutely deserved. The more virtuous one is, the further to the east will 
lie the peak of one's individual desert line. Thus, greater virtue shifts 
your peak to the east, while greater vice shifts it to the west More briefly: 
the more deserving deserve more. 
Perhaps, then, retributivists should accept a graph like the one shown 
in Figure 6. This displays mountain shaped desert lines for everyone, 
with the peaks moving from west to east as we move from great levels of 
overall vice to great levels of overall virtue. 
Figure 6. Desert lines with varying peaks. 
II 
What about the moderate? Should she accept Figure 6 as well? Ob-
viously enough, moderates cannot accept a view precisely like the one 
shown in Figure 6. For that graph includes desert lines with peaks along 
the left half of the X axis, and this means that the individuals in question 
deserve to suffer. But moderates, as we know, believe that no one at all 
deserves to suffer, no matter how vicious. So at a minimum, moderates 
will want to disallow all of the mountains drawn in the left half of Figure 6. 
Mountains with negative peaks (peaks with negative X coordinates) will 
simply be rejected by the moderate as impossible. 
It is important to be clear, however, that there is nothing at all in the 
idea of a mountain shaped desert line per se that must give the moderate 
pause. On the contrary, the moderate too can agree with the idea that 
everyone has a particular level of well-being that is absolutely deserved. 
And the moderate can accept as well the accompanying idea that not 
only is it bad to have less than one absolutely deserves, it is also bad 
(from the standpoint of desert) to have more than one deserves. Thus 
moderates too can accept the idea that the characteristic shape of an 
individual desert line is that of a mountain, rather than a straight line. 
From the perspective of the moderate, therefore, the problem with 
Figure 6 is not the fact that the desert lines are drawn as mountains, but 
rather the simple fact that some of those mountains have negative peaks. 
In effect, then, the moderate might accept a truncated version of Figure 
6-one where all the mountains with peaks to the west of the Y axis have 
been erased. (Some moderates will want to go even further, eliminating 
the mountain with the zero peak as well.) 
(It is worth noting, if only in passing, that if the moderate, like the 
retributivist, does accept the claim that the characteristic shape of an 
individual desert line is that of a mountain, we will have to redescribe the 
distinction between moderates and retributivists. Since each such moun-
tain will have a negative slope in its right half, we can no longer claim that 
only retributivists believe in the possibility of desert lines with negative 
slopes. Instead, we might try characterizing the difference between 
retributivists and moderates in this way: moderates deny, while 
retributivists accept, the possibility of desert lines with negative peaks.) 
Now it must be admitted that some moderates-and for that matter 
some retributivists-would reject the claim that all desert lines are shaped 
like mountains. For example, it might be suggested that if someone is 
sufficiently virtuous then the right half of their individual desert line 
should level off, rather than sloping down. (To say this would be to claim 
that we should reject the possibility of such a person having "too much" 
from the standpoint of desert.) But I won't try to explore this, or other, 
more exotic, possibilities here. Instead, I am simply going to assume that 
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something like the mountain shape is appropriate for everyone. For there 
is a different problem with Figure 6 (whether or not we truncate it to suit 
moderates) that I want to focus on instead: it systematically violates the 
plausible view that fault forfeits first. 
To see this, let's consider the desert lines of two individuals who 
differ significantly in terms ofhow virtuous they are-let one be a «saint," 
while the other is a .. sinner." Since the more deserving deserve more, the 
peak of the saint's desert line lies to the east of the peak of the sinner's 
desert line. Perhaps, then, the situation is like that shown in Figure 7 
(which selects two relevant mountains from Figure 6). 
Sinner Saint 
Figure 7. Giving someone less than they deserve. 
Now in the ideal case, of course-ideal, that is, from the standpoint 
of desert-each person would receive exactly the level of well-being that 
they absolutely deserve. Each person, that is, would be at their respec-
tive peak. Suppose, however, that this isn't possible. Instead, exactly one 
person, though it can be either person, can be given just what they 
deserve, while the other must be left some fixed amount-perhaps I 0 
units of well-being-short of this. 
Our choice, then, is this. We can have the saint located precisely at 
her peak, while the sinner is at point A, corresponding to a level of well-
being I 0 units Jess than what he absolutely deserves; or we can have the 
sinner at his peak, with the saint, instead, at point B. 
Clearly, either situation involves a dropoff from the ideal case; but 
from the standpoint of desert are the potential losses the same? Forced to 
choose whom to shortchange, is this a matter of indifference as far as 
desert is concerned? 
According to Figure 7 (and thus, by implication, Figure 6 as well), it 
is indeed a matter ofindifTerence. For that gmph portrays points A and 8 
as being equally far down along the Y axis. (There is an identical loss 
compared to the good that would have obtained ifthe given individual 
had been, instead, at their respective peak.) Intuitively, however, I think it 
is clear that it is better to shortchange the sinner rather than the saint. 
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That is, as far as desert is concerned, less good is lost when it is the 
sinner who falls short of receiving what he absolutely deserves than 
when it is the saint who falls short Thus Figure 7 does not actually 
represent the situation accurately. The I 0 unit shortfall should produce 
more of a drop along the Y axis in the case of the saint than it does in the 
case of the sinner. 
Think about what this means in tenns of the slopes of the two indi-
vidual desert lines. A 10 unit shift to the west along the X axis from the 
sinner's peak results in a smaller drop along theY axis than does a similar 
I 0 unit shift in the case of the saint. Thus, the slopes on the western sides 
of the two mountains must differ. More precisely, the western slope for 
the sinner's mountain must be gentler than the western slope for the 
saint's. 
A similar conclusion would be plausible even if we were to consider 
instead two individuals whose levels of virtue were significantly closer 
than those of the saint and the sinner. Though no doubt the effect would 
be less pronounced, it remains plausible to claim that from the standpoint 
of desert, if someone must be shortchanged, other things being equal it is 
better to shortchange the less virtuous rather than the more virtuous. 
Thus, the western slopes of desert lines must grow ever gentler, as we 
move to lower and lower levels of virtue. 
Turning our attention now to eastern slopes, suppose this time that 
while either the saint or the sinner can be given exactly what they abso-
lutely deserve, one of the two must be given more, again by some fixed 
amount. Here, too, then, some kind of loss is inevitable from the stand-
point of desert. But once again it seems implausible to suggest that it is a 
matter of indifference whether it is the saint or the sinner that is overcom-
pensated. On the contrary, it seems clear that if someone must receive 
more than they absolutely deserve, Jess good is lost from the standpoint 
of desert if it is the saint, rather than the sinner, who receives more than 
they deserve. Thus Figure 7 errs in this regard as well. The eastern slope 
of the saint's mountain should in fact be gentler than the eastern slope of 
the sinner's. 
Here, too, a similar conclusion would be plausible if we were to con-
sider instead two individuals who were significantly closer in tenns of 
their respective levels of virtue. Though the effect would presumably be 
less pronounced, it seems plausible to claim that from the standpoint of 
desert, if someone must be overcompensated, other things being equal it 
is better to overcompensate the more virtuous rather than the less virtu-
ous. Thus, as we move to lower and lower levels of virtue the eastern 
slopes of desert lines must grow ever steeper. 
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Putting these two sets of results together, we find that the desert 
lines rotate as we vary the level of virtue. Greater vice results in a gentler 
western slope and a steeper eastern slope; greater virtue results in a 
steeper western slope, and a gentler eastern slope. If we momentarily 
think of the peak as fixed, then changes in virtue and vice result in a 
swinging of the mountain like a bell: to the left for increased vice, to the 
right for increased virtue. The result is shown in Figure 8. (I have added 
imaginary bases to the mountains to make it easier to keep straight which 
segments represent western slopes, and which, eastern slopes; I've also 
exaggerated the amount of rotation, to make it easier to see.) We can call 
this effect bell motion. 
Figure 8. Bell motion. 
Arguably, all of this was already implied by the view that fault for-
feits first-<lr rather, it is implied once we recognize that the characteristic 
shape of the individual desert line is that of the mountain rather than the 
straight line. For fault forfeits first tells us that, other things being equal, 
the less virtuous go to the back of the line behind the more virtuous. 
Applying this idea is fairly straightforward with regard to the west-
em side of the desert line. If we will do more good-unit for unit-by 
aiding the more virtuous rather than the less virtuous, then the western 
slope of the desert line of the more virtuous person must be steeper. 
Admittedly, things are slightly more complicated with regard to the east-
em side of the line, since aiding those who have more than what they 
absolutely deserve actually makes things worse, rather than better. But 
even here, presumably, fault forfeits first holds that the less virtuous 
should go to the back of the line, in terms of receiving the extra aid. If we 
will do more good (or rather, more precisely, less bad) by overcompensat-
ing the more virtuous rather than the less virtuous, then the eastern slope 
must be gentler for the desert line of the more virtuous person. In short, 
fault forfeits first implies that the mountains rotate; it implies bell motion. 
It is for this reason that I claimed that Figure 6 involves a systematic 
violation offault forfeits first. Although the mountains shown in Figure 6 
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appropriately differ in tenns of their locations along the X axis, the corre-
sponding sides of the mountains all have the same slopes. (That is, the 
western sides all have the same slope, and the eastern sides all have the 
same slope.) But as we have just seen, if we accept the idea that fault 
forfeits first we will want to deny that the slopes are held fixed in this way. 
Rather, mountains should rotate, in keeping with bell motion. Instead of 
Figure 6, then, we should have Figure 9. (I've exaggerated the rate ofbell 
motion to make it easier to see. And moderates will, once again, prefer a 
truncated version of this graph-eliminating the mountains with peaks 
to the left ofthe Y axis.) 
Figure 9. Desert lines with bell motion. 
This graph nicely combines each of the main ideas that we have 
identified up to this point. The individual desert lines are mountains, 
rather than straight lines. The peaks of the mountains are spread out 
along the X axis, representing the fact that the more deserving deserve 
more. And the mountains themselves rotate, in accordance with bell mo-
tion: they swing to the left as we move to more vicious individuals, and to 
the right, as we move to individuals with greater virtue. 
Should we therefore accept Figure 9 as an adequate representation 
of the nature of desert? It is certainly more plausible than our earliest 
graphs, which displayed individual desert lines as simple straight lines, 
or the later graphs, which introduced mountain shaped desert lines, but 
failed to rotate them appropriately. But there arc at least two further fea-
tures of Figure 9 which might still be questioned. 
The first is this: although we have replaced simple straight lines with 
mountains, even so, the desert lines arc still ''straight," in the sense that 
the two sides of any given mountain are drawn as straight lines (or, more 
precisely, rays). Now from the very fact that the desert line is shaped like 
a mountain, it follows, of course, that the further you are from your peak, 
the worse the situation is from the standpoint of desert. But having the 
two sides of the mountain be straight like this has the additional particu-
lar implication that the dropoffin goodness grows linearly. That is, as we 
move further and further away from the peak (on a given side), each 
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additional unit change in the level of well-being makes the very same 
difference to the decrease in goodnCJ>s. 
This view-straight desert-is certainly a possibility. But I think 
that it is more plausible to accept instead an alternative view according to 
which the incremental dropoff increases, rather than staying constant, 
the further you are from the peak. That is to say, the further you are from 
having what you absolutely deserve, the greater the difference even 
small changes in well-being will make. On this alternative view-curved 
desert-the sides of the mountain are not straight, but rather are curved, 
growing steeper and steeper, the further from the peak you go. Thus, an 
individual desert line might look more like the one shown in Figure I 0. 
Figure 10. Curved desert. 
Clearly, ifl am right in thinking that curved desert is the more plau-
sible ofthe two views, then at least one revision of Figure 9 is called for: 
we would need to redraw the graph, substituting mountains with curved 
sides where we currently have mountains with straight ones. Nonethe-
less, in what follows I am going to continue to draw individual desert 
lines with straight sides. So far as I can see, this simplification shouldn't 
affect any of our remaining points (and at least sometimes, I think, it can 
be easier to grasp the essential points of a desert graph when it is drawn 
from the perspective of straight desert). 
The second feature ofFigure 9 that might be questioned is this: all of 
the mountains in this graph are drawn at the same height. That is, al-
though the peaks of the various mountains differ in terms of their X 
coordinates, they all share the same Y coordinate. More particularly, all 
the peaks fall at the same point along the upper half of the Y axis. Figure 
9 thus expresses a further pair of thoughts: first, that it always does some 
good for a given individual to be at their peak; and second, that it always 
does the very same amount of good, regardless of how virtuous or vi-
cious the person may be. But either of these thoughts could be ques-
tioned. 
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To explore this issue, let's introduce a simpler kind of desert graph, 
one that plots only the locations of the various possible peaks. Eliminat-
ing any information about the sides of the mountains, this leaves us with 
a graph of what I will call the skyline. 
Of course, Figure 9 actually shows only a very small sample of its 
possible mountains (otherwise the graph would appear as an undifferen-
tiated gray band). But when dmwing the skyline we are not limited in this 
way: we can include all of the peaks countenanced by the general view in 
question. including those not explicitly shown in Figure 9 itself. The 
result-the skyline presupposed by Figure 9-is shown in Figure 11. (As 
usuql, moderates will prefer a truncated version of this graph.) 
Skyline 
\ . .. 
Figure 11. The standard skyline. 
This is an example of a standard skyline. It is a straight line, parallel 
to the X axis, cutting across the upper half of the Y axis. As we have 
already noted, if we accept the standard skyline we are claiming that it 
always does some good-and indeed, the very same amount of good-
for a given individual to be at their peak. In effect, to accept the standard 
skyline is to hold that even though people differ in terms of how much 
well-being they absolutely deserve, it is equally important, from the stand-
. point of desert, for people to get whatever it is that they absolutely 
deserve. You may well deserve far more happiness than me, for example, 
but when I get the well-being that I do deserve this does just as much 
good from the standpoint of desert as when you get the greater level of 
well-being that you deserve. 
Clearly, this is not an unattractive view. It implies that in one crucial 
sense everyone matters equally from the perspective of desert, even 
though not everyone is equally deserving. But there are alternatives to it, 
which can also seem compelling. First of all, even if we agree that it 
should do the same amount of good whenever someone is at their peak, 
perhaps we should not be so quick to assume that it actually does pro-
duce a robustly good state of affairs when someone gets what they 
deserve. Perhaps, instead, all that happens is this: when people get what 
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they absolutely deserve, an intrinsically bad state of affairs that would 
otherwise obtain is eliminated. 
According to this alternative view, it is an intrinsically bad state of 
affairs (from the standpoint of desert) when someone has less, or more, 
than what they absolutely deserve. And the further they are from their 
peak, the worse it is. But this means, of course, that the closer someone is 
to their peak, the more of this intrinsic bad that has been eliminated. In the 
limit case, then, when someone is getting precisely what they absolutely 
deserve, the bad will have been eliminated altogether. But no intrinsic 
good will thereby be created. 
Thus, the state of affairs in which someone gets what they deserve is 
a good one only in the comparative sense that it avoids all of the intrinsic 
bad to be had when someone fails to get what they deserve. But it won't 
be good in a robust sense: no positive intrinsic value is introduced when 
someone is at their peak. 
I fa view like this is accepted, virtually all of any given mountain will 
lie below the X axis. Only the peaks of the mountains will touch the X axis 
itself. Desert lines will thus be like underwater mountains, with peaks just 
managing to touch the water line; at no point, however, will the moun-
tains ever break through into open air. 
Since the peaks of these mountains all lie on the X axis, the skyline 
on .this alternative conception is still a straight line. But unlike the stan-
dard skyline, which runs parallel to the X axis and crosses the Y axis in its 
upper half, this alternative skyline-the sea level skyline-coincides 
exactly with the X axis itself. Accordingly, if we were to accept this con-
ception ofthe skyline we would need to replace Figure 9 with something 
like Figure 12. 
Figure 12. Desert lines with n sea level skyline. 
The choice between the standard skyline and the sea level skyline 
turns on the question of whether considerations of desert can be the 
source of positive intrinsic value. If someone is getting exactly what they 
deserve, is this a robust good, or merely the elimination of a robust bad? 
This is obviously an important question for the theory of desert, but I 
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won't try to settle it here. Instead, I want to mention a third possible 
conception of the skyline. For both the standard skyline and the sea level 
skyline share the underlying assumption that it always does the same 
amount of good for someone to be at their peak-and this assumption 
can itself be called into question. 
Instead of assuming that it is equally important, from the standpoint 
of desert, for everyone to get what they deserve, it might be suggested 
that it is more important for those individuals who are morally more "sig-
nificant" to get what they absolutely deserve. If you deserve far more 
happiness than me, for example, then perhaps it does more good (from 
the standpoint of desert) when you get what you deserve. There are 
various ways this idea might be developed, of course, but the simplest 
proposal would be that the amount of good done when someone gets 
what they deserve is directly proportional to how much happiness or 
suffering they absolutely deserve. If someone deserves a great deal of 
suffering, or a great deal of happiness, then it does a great deal of good 
when they get this; in contrast, if someone deserves only a small amount 
of happiness, or a small amount of suffering, it simply does less good, in 
comparison, when they receive it. 
If a view like this third alternative is accepted, then the skyline is no 
longer going to be a straight line, parallel to (or coinciding with) the X 
axis. Instead, it will look like a V, with its base anchored at the origin. This 
possibility-the V shaped skyline-is shown in Figure 13. 
Figure 13. The V shaped skyline. 
On this view, it is more important that the morally more significant 
get what they deserve. Note, however, that this is not quite the same 
thing as saying that it is more important that the more deserving get what 
they deserve. For if it is indeed possible for someone to deserve great 
suffering-as at least some retributivists would claim-then it might well 
do more good if such a person gets what they deserve than it would if, 
instead, someone who merely deserved a very modest amount of happi-
ness got what they absolutely deserved. 
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Of course, if you are a moderate, then you will hold that no one at all 
deserves to suffer. So here, too, moderates will prefer a truncated version 
of the graph, one where the entire left wing ofthe V has been eliminated. 
And while it is, perhaps, a bit strained to refer to the result of this process 
as still being a V (what remains, after all, is only half a V), the more 
important point is to see that even here the moderate is accepting an 
appropriately truncated portion of the underlying V shaped skyline. 
(An alternative approach to the V shaped skyline interprets the no-
tion of "moral significance" not in terms of the amount of happiness or 
suffering that is deserved, but rather in terms of how virtuous or vicious 
the given individual is. On this approach, presumably, the V will be an-
chored at the point on the X axis that corre"Sponds to the precise level of 
well-being deserved by someone who is neither virtuous nor vicious 
overall. And for moderates-as well as many retributivists-this point 
will fall to the right of the origin. Thus even if moderates are right, and 
negative peaks are impossible, the skyline will still have a genuine left 
branch, retaining a recognizably V-like shape.) 
The V shaped skyline represents an important alternative to both the 
standard skyline and the sea level skyline, in that it rejects the assump-
tion-common to the two latter views-that it always does the same 
amount of good to give someone what they deserve, regardless of how 
virtuous or vicious they may be. But I will not attempt to investigate the 
plausibility of this alternative any further here. I will simply note the 
obvious point that if we were, in fact, to accept a V shaped skyline, then 
Figure 9 would need to be revised yet again. 
Regardless of how we ultimately settle this question concerning the 
nature of the skyline, i't should by now be abundantly clear just how 
inadequate was our initial account of desert, limited as it was to assigning 
different culpability discount rates, or culpability multipliers, to different 
people. Such an account grossly mischaracterizes the nature of indi-
vidual desert lines. For a theory limited to assigning multipliers is, in 
effect, a theory according to which all individual desert lines are straight 
lines, differing only in terms of their slopes. From the standpoint of our 
current theory, however, such an account gets a great deal wrong. 
Most importantly, of course, it overlooks the fact that individual 
desert lines are not to be represented in terms of simple straight lines, but 
rather as mountains. Drawing the lines as mountains appropriately ex-
presses the idea that for each person there is a particular level of well-
being that is absolutely deserved, so that if the person has either less or 
more than that amount there is a dropofT in value from the standpoint of 
desert. But note that this central idea-the idea of what each person 
absolutely deserves-is one that we cannot even formulate if we are 
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limited to thinking in terms of multipliers. (And, of course, without this 
idea we cannot even begin to raise the kinds of questions about the 
skyline that we have just been considering; for if we lack the very idea of 
absolute desert we obviously cannot ask just how much good is done 
when someone receives what they absolutely deserve.) 
To be sure, the appeal to multipliers did correspond to the important 
idea that the slopes of individual desert lines vary, depending on the 
given individual's level of virtue or vice. But even this idea is mishandled. 
For there are, after all, two sides to every mountain, and thus two slopes 
that must be assigned. Yet the multiplier approach assigns only a single 
number to any given individual, and so it cannot possibly tell us every-
thing we need to know about the slopes. What's more, we can't even say 
that at least all multipliers provide information about the very same side 
of the mountain. On the contrary, positive multipliers correspond to posi-
tive slopes, and thus provide information about the western sides of 
individual desert lines, while negative multipliers correspond to negative 
slopes, thus providing information about the eastern sides. But there is 
nothing in the simple appeal to multipliers that marks or explains the 
significance of this switch. 
In short, we have long since transcended the simple account of 
desert with which we began. Our graphs now represent a far richer and 
significantly more adequate approach to desert. 
(This is not to say, of course, that this richer account could not have 
been presented in nongraphic terms. But at the same time I hope it is 
apparent that our desert graphs manage to represent this richer account 
in a manner that is both compact and perspicuous. This is, indeed, a 
general advantage of graphs that is worth emphasizing. Regardless of 
what theory of desert one accepts, graphs provide an easy and intuitive 
way to compare the essential features of rival theories. And within a 
given theory, graphing individual desert lines allows a ready grasp of the 
overall profile of any given person from the standpoint of desert.) 
Now the theory of desert that we have been developing is obviously 
still incomplete in a number of ways. Most obviously, we haven't tried to 
settle what the skyline should look like. But this is far from being the only 
significant omission. For example, although I have argued for the exist-
ence of bell motion, I have said very little about the particular rate at 
which desert lines rotate. And for that matter, although I have argued for 
the centrality of the idea that people differ in terms of what they abso-
lutely deserve, I have said almost nothing about the function that as-
signs particular levels of well-being, as being absolutely deserved, on 
the basis of one's particular level of virtue. A variety of other details and 
complications remain unexplored as well. Nonetheless, I think it fair to 
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suggest that the inain elements of this part of the theory of desert are now 
in place. 
But this brings us to a point that it is important to be clear about. 
What we have been discussing so far is indeed only one part of an 
adequate theory of desert. We have, in effect, been developing the theory 
of noncomparative desert. A complete theory of desert. however, will 
need to cover comparative desert as well. 
Let me explain what I mean by saying that the theory that we have 
been developing is essentially a noncomparative one. The key point is 
this: for any given individual, to determine how much intrinsic value 
there is from the standpoint of desert in that person's being at a given 
level of well-being, we need only consider that person's individual desert 
line. By determining whether the person has more or less than what they 
absolutely deserve (whether they are to the east or to the west of their 
peak) I learn whether specific changes in their level of well-being would 
make the situation better or worse, and by how much. Thus, I need to 
consider facts about the person's individual desert line, as well as facts 
about the person's actual and possible levels of well-being. But what I do 
not need to take into account is what other people deserve, or how well 
off they may be. Facts about the well-being of others, or how deserving 
they are, are simply irrelevant to deciding how much good it would do for 
a given person to be at a given level of well-being. That's what I mean in 
saying that the theory is essentially noncomparative. 
Of course, once we make these various noncomparative judgments 
we can certainly compare and compound them. We can ask, for example, 
whether it would do more good to aid one person by a certain amount, 
rather than aiding a different person. But for all that, the information 
being compounded in this way is essentially noncomparative in nature. 
A complete theory of desert, however, will include comparative prin-
ciples as well.3 For although it matters whether I am getting what I (abso-
lutely) deserve, this is not all that matters. It also matters how I am doing 
compared to you, in light of how (noncomparatively) deserving we both 
are. Thus, for example, if I am just as virtuous as you are, then I should be 
doing just as well as you are (no matter how well you are doing). Similarly, 
if you are more virtuous than I am, then you should be better off than I am 
(no matter how well otTI am). 
These claims are essentially comparative ones, since they go be-
yond the simple noncomparative question of whether a given individual 
is getting what she absolutely deserves. They are concerned, rather, with 
comparing levels of well-being, in light of how (noncomparatively) de-
serving we are. Of course, comparative desert is not the only value, and 
so what is better from the standpoint of comparative desert may not be 
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better all things considered; comparative desert may weD be outweighed 
by other relevant values. But I think it is clear that most of us do feel the 
pull of these comparative considerations as well. 
Indeed, even if we restrict our attention to considerations of desert 
alone, comparative desert will often be opposed by noncomparative desert. 
But we feel the pull of comparative desert nonetheless. Suppose, for 
example, that Bertha is far more virtuous than Alfred, but that Alfred is 
better ofT than Bertha. Indeed, he is at a higher level of well-being than 
either of them absolutely deserves. Unfortunately, we cannot alter Alfred's 
level of well-being, but we can improve Bertha's. Suppose, however, that 
although Bertha is at a significantly lower level Qfwell-being than Alfred, 
nonetheless she is already receiving exactly what she absolutely de-
serves. Even so, isn't there something to be said in favor of improving 
Bertha's position, so that she bas more than Alfred? 
Noncomparative desert clearly says no. To improve Bertha's level of 
well-being would be to give her more than she absolutely deserves, 
which-from the standpoint ofnoncomparative desert-can only make 
things worse. The fact that Alfred is already beyond the level of well-
being that he deserves is certainly bad, but moving Bertha beyond hers 
as well doesn't make things better. 
But from the standpoint of comparative desert there is indeed some-
thing to be said in favor of moving Bertha. After all, Bertha is far more 
virtuous than Alfred, and so deserves to be better off than he is. In this 
regard, at the very least, increasing Bertha's level of well-being so that 
she ends up better off than Alfred is in fact an improvement 
In cases like this we have a conflict between comparative and 
noncomparative desert. So those of us who want to incorporate both 
aspects into a complete theory of desert will eventually need to work out 
a tradeoff schedule, indicating which of the two has more weight in such 
cases of conflict. But that won't be my concern here, for there is a more 
immediately pressing question, namely, what would the requisite com-
parative principle look like? 
The basic idea at play here, of course, is clear: comparative desert 
demands that my level of well-being stand in the right relation to your 
level of well-being, where this relation is itself a function of how our 
respective levels of virtue compare. But what exactly is the relevant rela-
tion? What exactly does the requisite comparative principle demand? 
I imagine that the most widely accepted candidate for the compara-
tive principle is the ratio view. According to this view, comparative desert 
is satisfied when my level of well-being stands to your level of well-being 
as my level of virtue stands to your level of virtue. Thus, if you are twice 
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as virtuous as me, you should be twice as well off. If I am one third as 
virtuous as you, I should be one third as well off. 
Given the natural assumption that what someone absolutely deserves 
is fixed in proportion to their level of virtue, this comes to the same thing 
as saying that the ratio between our levels of well-being should be the 
same as the ratio between the levels of well-being that we absolutely 
deserve. Thus, for example, if I absolutely deserve one third as much 
well-being as you, the ratio view holds that I should be one third as well 
off. 
(This natural assumption-that absolute desert is fixed in propor-
tion to virtue-can certainly be challenged, in which case we will need to 
distinguish between two different versions of the ratio view: those that 
fix the relevant ratio in tenns of virtue, and those that fix it in terms of what 
is absolutely deserved. But since both versions are subject to the kinds 
of difficulties I am about to raise, for simplicity let's suppose that the 
natural assumption is correct.) 
Suppose, then, for example, that A absolutely deserves 10 units of 
well-being and B absolutely deserves 20. Obviously enough, 
noncomparative desert will be satisfied in this case only when A is indeed 
receiving I 0 and B is receiving 20. But our present concern is with the 
demands of comparative desert. and according to the ratio view this will 
be perfectly satisfied whenever B is twice as well ofT as A. Thus, for 
example, if A is at 3, B should be at 6; and if A, instead, is at 150, B should 
beat300. 
I believe, however, that despite the popularity of the ratio view it 
must be rejected. In a variety of cases it simply gives unacceptable an-
swers. I am going to limit myself to noting two such cases. 
First, suppose that A absolutely deserves 0 units of well-being, while 
B absolutely deserves I 0. And imagine that A is, in fact, at 0. Where, then, 
should B be placed? 
Unfortunately, it seems that the ratio view will be satisfied wherever 
B is placed, so long as A remains at 0. For according to the ratio view, A 
should have 0 units of well-being for every I 0 units that B has, and this 
will indeed be the case regardless of where B is placed, provided that A 
has 0. But this is absurd. It is quite unacceptable to suggest that com-
parative desert is indifferent in this case to how we place B. Indeed, it 
seems as though the ratio view will be satisfied even if B is given a 
negative level of well-being (since A will still have 0 units for every 10 that 
B has). But this, too, is unacceptable. Indeed, it violates one of the origi-
nal intuitions that we used to motivate the need for a comparative prin-
ciple in the fll'St place, the intuition that the more virtuous (here, B) should 
be better off than the less virtuous (A). 
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Or imagine, second, that A absolutely deserves -10 (he deserves to 
suffer somewhat) while B absolutely deserves +20. Here the relevant 
ratio is -10 to +20. That is, for each negative unit of well-being had by A, 
B should have two positive units of well-being. And now suppose that 
A's actual level of well-being is fixed at -5. Where should B be placed to 
satisfY comparative desert? 
It seems that advocates of the ratio view must claim that B should be 
placed at+ 10. This is the only level of well-being forB that maintains the 
relevant ratio (given that A is at -5), since it is this level, and only this 
level, that gives B two positive units for every one of A's negative units. 
But this result, too, is completely unacceptable. Think about what it 
says. A is a vicious individual, sufficiently vicious, indeed, that he 
noncomparatively deserves to be at -I 0. In fact, however, he is only at -5, 
a higher level of well-being than the one he absolutely deserves. What 
then does comparative desert tell us to do in this case? According to the 
ratio view, it tells us to take the more virtuous individual, B, and give her 
less than she absolutely deserves! 
This is absurd. A plausible theory of comparative desert cannot in-
struct us to give a more virtuous person less than what she absolutely 
deserves in response to a less virtuous person having more than what he 
absolutely deserves. Yet this is exactly what the ratio view tells us to do 
in this case. So the ratio view must be rejected. 
In its place, I want to propose an alternative comparative principle, 
which I will call theY gap view.4 The guiding idea behind this alternative 
approach is this: comparative desert is perfectly satisfied when (and only 
when) the offense against noncomparative desert is the same for all rel-
evant individuals. Unlike noncomparative desert, after all, comparative 
desert is not primarily concerned with whether people have what they 
absolutely deserve. Rather, it is concerned with how people compare in 
this regard. So even if your situation and my situation both involve some 
shortcoming from the perspective of noncomparative desert, so long as 
both of our situations involve the same offense against noncomparative 
desert, comparative desert will be perfectly satisfied. 
Suppose, for example, that I have more than what I absolutely de-
serve to have. This situation falls short of what is ideal from the stand-
point of noncomparative desert, and thus involves an "offense" against 
noncomparative desert. But so long as you too have more than what you 
absolutely deserve-or, more precisely, enough more-so that your situ-
ation involves a similar offense against noncomparative desert, then nei-
ther of us has a comparative advantage with regard to how each is doing 
relative to what each absolutely deserves. The offenses against 
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noncomparative desert will be the same, and thus comparative desert will 
be satisfied. 
Clearly, to make good on this idea, we need an account of when 
offenses against noncomparative desert are the same. In the ideal case, of 
course, where both of us receive exactly what we absolutely deserve, 
neither of our situations involves any offense at all against 
noncomparative desert, and so, trivially, comparative desert will be satis-
fied. But what about nonideal cases, where one or the other of us has 
more or Jess than he deserves? What must be the case for two such 
offenses to be the same? 
It seems to me that there are actually two conditions that must be met 
if the situations of two individuals are to offend against noncomparative 
desert in exactly the same way. 
The first condition involves what we might think of as a qualitative 
constraint. Similar offenses must be ofthe same kind. If one person has 
more than they absolutely deserve, the other person must have more as 
well; if one has Jess, so must the other. Otherwise, the offenses cannot 
possibly be the same. We can call this the symmetry constraint.' It tells 
us that if either party is moved off their peak, then comparative desert is 
satisfied only if both are moved in the same direction. 
Clearly, however, the symmetry constraint by itself cannot consti-
tute an adequate account. For if B 's situation is to offend against 
noncomparative desert in exactly the same way that A's situation of-
fends, it will not suffice for it to be an offense of the same kind; it must 
also be the same size. So we need a quantitative constraint as well. 
But how is the size of an offense against non comparative desert to 
be measured? As it happens, there is a very plausible proposal that sug-
gests itself here. Begin by recalling that in what constitutes the ideal case 
from the perspective of noncomparative desert-when someone gets 
exactly what they absolutely deserve-the given individual is at the peak 
of their individual desert line. In contrast, when someone has less, or 
more, than they absolutely deserve, there is a dropoff in value; points to 
the west or the east of the peak are lower down along the Y axis than the 
peak itself. Thus, when someone is not at their peak, there is a "gap" 
between the amount of good (from the standpoint of noncomparative 
desert) that would obtain if they were at their peak, and the amount of 
good that actually does obtain, given their actual level of well-being. And 
the greater the gap-the greater the drop along the Y axis-the greater 
the offense against noncomparative desert. 
Thus we arrive at the Y gap constraint. It holds that comparative 
desert is satisfied only when the situation of each person is such as to 
involve a drop along the Y axis of exactly the same size. 
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To be sure, we would still lack an adequate account of when two 
offenses are exactly the same if we had to make do with theY gap con-
straint alone. For this constraint can typically be satisfied in two ways, 
since a Y gap of a given size can normally be produced by locating 
someone on either of the two slopes of their individual desert line. Thus, 
even with the Y gap constraint in place the symmetry constraint is still 
required as well, to tell us which of these two locations is appropriate. 
But once the Y gap constraint is combined with the symmetry con-
straint we do have a plausible account of what it is for offenses against 
noncomparative desert to be exactly the same. Taken together, therefore, 
they provide a highly plausible account of comparative desert: compara-
tive desert is satisfied precisely when the situations ofthe relevant indi-
viduals involve similar offenses against noncomparative desert-offenses 
of the same kind and of the same size. I call this account of comparative 
desert the Y gap view. 
Figure 14 shows theY gap view at work. (I've assumed a standard 
skyline in this graph and exaggerated the rate of bell motion to make it 
easy to see; but this won't affect the relevant points.) Suppose that A has 
more than he absolutely deserves, but that there is nothing we can do 
about this. Where should B be placed in order to satisfY the demands of 
comparative desert? We know-given the symmetry constraint-that 
since A has more than he absolutely deserves, B should have more than 
she absolutely deserves as well. But how much more? Enough more, so 
that theY gap produced by B's being at this level of well-being would be 
the very same size as theY gap produced by A's being at his actual level 
of well-being. Thus, the drop along theY axis (as measured from their 
respective peaks) should be exactly the same size for B as for A; and 
since A is located on his eastern slope, B should be placed on her eastern 
slope as well. 
A'spealc 
Figure 14. TheY gap view. 
(Similarly, of course, in a case where A has less than he absolutely 
deserves, comparative desert will be satisfied provided that B too has 
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less than what she deserves-just enough less, in fact, so that the Y gap 
created by B 's situation is exactly the same size as theY gap created by 
Ns situation.) 
I believe that theY gap view gives us plausible answers quite gener-
ally. But instead of arguing this point in detail, let me limit myself to 
notingjust how readily it handles the two problematic cases that led us to 
reject the ratio view. 
In the first of these cases, recall, A absolutely deserves 0 units of 
well-being, while B absolutely deserves 10, and A is actually receiving 0. 
The ratio view unacceptably implies that comparative desert will be satis-
fied in this case regardless of where B is located. But theY gap view has 
no such implication. Instead, it notes that if A absolutely deserves 0 and 
is actually receiving 0, then A's situation involves no offense against 
noncomparative desert at all; thus, comparative desert will be satisfied if 
and only if B's situation similarly involves no offense against 
noncomparative desert. Which is to say, since A is at his peak, B must be 
at her peak as well. So B must be placed at I 0. And this is, of course, a 
very plausible conclusion. 
In the second case, A absolutely deserves -10, B absolutely de-
serves +20, and A is actually at -5. Here the ratio view absurdly implies 
that in the face of A having more than he absolutely deserves, B should 
have less. But theY gap view easily avoids this absurdity as well: since A 
has more than be absolutely deserves, symmetry demands that the same 
should also be true of B. 
Unlike the ratio view, therefore, theY gap view can provide the basis 
for a plausible general account of comparative desert. It provides only 
the basis for such an account, however-and not the complete account-
since the Y gap view by itself only tells us what must be the case for 
comparative desert to be perfeclly satisfied. It docs not tell us how to 
rank outcomes when the demands of comparative desert are only imper-
fectly satisfied. So if we are going to be able to compare such outcomes, 
we will first need to appropriately extend theY gap view. But I won't try 
to do that here either. 
Instead, I want to conclude this discussion by returning to the theme 
with which I began, the complexity of desert. As we have seen, despite 
the hold that considerations of desert have upon much of our moral 
thinking, many questions about the nature of desert have been insuffi-
ciently explored, or neglected altogether. As a result, the underlying struc-
ture of desert is something that is not yet adequately understood. 
Most of us, of course, are inclined to agree that it is a good thing if 
people get what they deserve; we intuitively recognize the value of desert. 
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What we have generally failed to recognize, I think, is just how compli-
cated this value turns out to be. 
Notes 
I. In all that follows I draw on my considerably larger work in progress, 
The Geomelry of Deserl, which also examines a great many complications and 
qualifications that I cannot consider here. 
2. The phrase comes from Joel Feinberg, "Sua Culpa," in Doing and De-
serving (Princeton: 1970), pp. 187-221, at p. 218. 
3. My discussion of comparative desert is particularly abbreviated. For a 
fuller-though still incomplete-treatment, see "Comparative Desert," in Desert 
and Jus/ice, edited by Serena Olsaretti (Oxford: 2003), pp. 93-122. 
4. It was suggested to me, independently, by both Alastair Norcross and 
Kyle Stanford. Clearly, I owe a tremendous debt to both of them. 
S. I called it the symmetry principle in "Comparative Desert." 
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